DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S CONDUCT OF DETENTIONS, INTERROGATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR?
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The current administration has invoked the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 20011 as a Congressional sanction for expansive detention and surveillance authority in the so-called "Global War on Terror." Those invocations have been controversial, eliciting widespread criticism in the academic literature 2 and generating litigation that has produced mixed results for the administration. 3 However important those debates are at present, the ordinary political process is capable of clarifying Congress' intent and adjusting the rules before the next national crisis tests their limits. But putting to one side questions about how broadly the AUMF may be applied to trump various other statutes appearing to limit detention and surveillance powers, there is a more abstract question lurking behind the executive branch's assertions of Congressional acquiescence. This question, raised as a fallback position by the administration before almost every court where it has defended these practices, may ultimately determine the limits future Congresses can place on assertions of executive war powers: does the Constitution forbid Congress from placing restrictions on the way in which the President conducts detentions, interrogations, and surveillance in the context of war?
In a variety of fora-litigation, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos, academic white papers-the President has argued that his power in these areas is unlimited, at least as to a core set of war powers-particularly powers to defend the nation from attack. The current administration has argued that the President may ignore-as unconstitutional-Congressional limitations placed on his power to conduct electronic surveillance by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); limitations placed on his power to detain individuals without judicial scrutiny in habeas corpus proceedings; limitations on his power to detain United States citizens created by the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a); limitations on executive power to torture detainees imposed by federal criminal law (the federal War Crimes Act, Torture Act, and Assault Statute); limitations originating in international law on his power to hold, torture, interrogate, and try detainees, as exemplified by treaties ratified by the Senate (specifically the Geneva Conventions and Convention against Torture); and limitations on his power to create from whole cloth military commissions that violate those obligations, as codified by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. An as-yet-unleaked memo indicates that the administration would argue that the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the extent that it limits the use of military force for the military purpose of preventing and deterring terrorism within the United States. 4 Indeed, as one might guess from the laundry list of coun-remainder of this Article assesses the impact on the administration's legal arguments in the specific contexts of detention, torture, and surveillance. Before we begin exploring where these expansive claims of uncheckable presidential powers originate, it is important to highlight one important distinction between permissive situations where Congress has not attempted to regulate a field-for example, foreign intelligence surveillance before 1978 9 -and situations where it has prohibited or regulated certain presidential actions. In the first, the President can act if the Constitution gives him some express or implicit power. In the second, he can only act in the face of a Congressional prohibition or restriction if the Constitution consigns a power to him exclusively. So, for example, the President is thought to have the exclusive power to decide whether formally to recognize countries as part of the power to "receive ambassadors" enumerated in Article II."0 I doubt Congress could Hamilton interpreted the power to receive ambassadors the same way, and felt that this express grant of power could affect the status of treaties previously approved by the Senate as well:
The right of the executive to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, may serve to illustrate the relative duties of the executive and legislative departments. This right includes that ofjudging, in the case of a revolution of government in a foreign country, whether the new rulers are competent organs of the national will, and ought to be recognized, or not; which, where a treaty antecedently exists between the United States and such nation, involves the power of continuing or suspending its operation. For until the new government is acknowledged, the trea-[Vol. 11:23 regulate it. 1 Whatever one thinks of the complex question of the scope of Congressional power to initiate or stop wars, the President clearly has some inherent power to use force to defend the United States without prior Congressional approval: "If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority."
1 2 This seems to accord with the intent of the Framers: Madison's notes from the Philadelphia convention show that they gave Congress the power to "declare" war in lieu of the power to "make" war in order to "leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." 3 Now, can Congress regulate the manner in which force is used in any circumstances-whether during a "crisis" provoked by "invaties between the nations, so far at least as regards public rights, are of course suspended. PACIFICUS No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jun. 29, 1793).
11 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 establishes the "policy of the United States" and the "sense of the Congress" as to conditions for recognition of any future "transitional" Cuban government, but does not cast these conditions as mandatory. Pub. L. 104-114, § § 201 (13), 207(d), 110 Stat. 785, 805, 813 (1996) . 12 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. sion," or otherwise? Clearly, it can: the Constitution expressly provides that Congress may "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," 14 and "define and punish * . . Offences against the Law of Nations,"' 5 including law-of-war offenses. (Nothing contradicts the view that this latter power allows Congress to regulate our own forces as well as those of an enemy encountered on the battlefield.) Does this power to regulate the use of the armed forces have its limits? Could Congress tell the President he absolutely cannot respond to some conventional attack on the homeland, until he consults with Congress and gets authorization? Arguably the answer here is no: Article IV, sec. 4 says the United States shall protect the states against invasion and guarantee them "a Republican Form of Government." 16 Thus, the notion that the President is "bound to resist force by force."' 7 The Republican Form of Government Clause is one of the few areas where the federal government has not merely authority to act, but affirmative obligations to act-here, to defend the states. 18 So, let us assume some level of duty to protect the states is part of the core war power of the President. Is there more to the idea of a core to the executive war power that the Congress cannot touch? Often people who believe in such a core believe that Congress cannot regulate the actual tactical decisions on the battlefield-field operational decisions, command and control functions, or advance and retreat decisions. This is widely expressed as the idea that Congress cannot regulate the "movement of troops on the battlefield." 19 If one traces this assertion back to its roots, one finds a handful of offhand, not very authoritative sources. First is the statement from Chief Justice Chase's concurrence in Milligan that, although Congress has authority to legislate to support the prosecution of a war, Congress may not "interfere[ ] with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief." 2° The second source is an otherwise obscure memorandum from the future Justice Robert Jackson, at the time President Franklin Roosevelt's Attorney General, concerning the legality of military assistance to Great Britain prior to America's entry into World War II:
" Dictionary, does not support Jackson's conclusion that the armed forces are exclusively under the President's control:
Congress has power to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Under these grants of authority it may clearly regulate the enlistment of soldiers and sailors, prescribe the number, rank and pay of officers, provide for and regulate arms, ships, forts, arsenals, the organization of the land and naval forces, courts-martial, military offenses and their punishment, and the like. And all these laws and regulations the President is to carry into effect, not in his character as commander in chief, but as a part of his general executive duty, and with as great or as little choice of means and methods as congress may see fit to confide to him. But again, in virtue of his rank as the head of the forces, he has certain powers and duties with which congress may not interfere. For instance, he may regulate the movements of the army and the stationing of them at various posts. So also he may direct the movements of the vessels of the navy, sending them wherever in his judgment it is expedient. Neither here nor in a state of war is there any necessary conflict. BLACK, HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at . 23 Hartzman notes that, in The Federalist No. 23, Hamilton states: "The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support," but, that of all of these, the only one not paralleling language of grants in Article I is "direct their operation"-thus implying it was reserved for the Commander in Chief. Hartzman, supra note 19, at 75. Of course, that is at once quite an inferential leap-Hamilton might just as well have assumed it was part of one of the enumerated Article I powers-and says nothing to whether the hypothesized executive power to "direct" is exclusive to the executive or a field of concurrent authority. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 12, at 780 (noting the use of the phrase "directing their operation" in the Articles of Confederation and analyzing the significance of its exclusion from Article I).
Hartzman also cites three records of debates in state ratifying conventions: a Maryland objection that the President "should not command in person," and similar arguments in the Virginia and North Carolina debates. Hartzman, supra note 19, at 74 n.78. Again, none is conclusive as to whether the power is exclusive to the execu-This is quite short authority for the vast claims of executive power that the current administration's legal staff have made from it, at least viewed standing by itself. But is there some logic to the notion that tactical decisions about how to best implement the inherent executive power to protect the United States are immune from Congressional regulation?
Defenders of uncheckable presidential power over movement of troops and similar tactical decisions on the battlefield point to the Commander in Chief Clause as an "enumerated" source of that power. But the Commander in Chief Clause does not describe a "power" to be conveyed to the President-the clause simply says "[t]he President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," in contrast to four other express grants of power to the President in Article 11. 24 The clause is best read as a negative of autonomous military leadership of the armed forces-simply making clear that ultimate control over the military always rests with the civilian President-rather than as a grant of uncheckable power to the executive. As Hamilton put it:
The President is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would appertain to the tive or concurrent in both branches. As a general matter, these debates in the state ratifying conventions (and records of the public debates accompanying them, e.g., The Federalist) are far more conclusive as sources of "legislative intent" with respect to constitutional provisions than the notes of the Philadelphia convention debates, since the states were the relevant legislators, and the delegates their drafters. See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note 12 (describing the relevant historical sources). 24 "The executive power shall be vested in a President" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States," id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; "power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties," id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; "power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate," id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. The Opinions clause might be included in this list as well, though it does not use the term "power": "he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." Id. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
Some scholars argue that the Commander in Chief Clause merely conveys a title, but that broad uncheckable executive war powers are conveyed by the Executive Vesting Clause (the first clause cited in the previous paragraph). See Prakash, supra note 19, at 1319 n.1. legislature. 25 The history of the phrase "commander in chief," as evidenced through historical practice in England, in America during the Revolution, in the Articles of Confederation, and in the various state constitutions using the phrase at the time, overwhelmingly supports the notion that the Founders would have understood that the legislature could regulate the manner in which the commander in chief exercised his command. 26 , 1987) . 26 This history is admirably and comprehensively set forth by Barron and Lederman. Barron & Lederman, supra note 12, at 772-800. To summarize it briefly here, in English historical usage, when Parliament appointed generals as commander in chief, it often did so expressly subject to directions that might be conveyed from Parliament in the future. Id. at 772-73. Such was the century of preceding practice against which General Washington was appointed "General and Commander in chief" by the Continental Congress in 1775. Id. at 773. The Continental Congress "did not hesitate" to instruct its commander in chief in great detail, even regarding tactical decisions, going so far as to send committees to the front, and countermanding some of his most strongly held judgments about tactics, particularly during the losing battle for New York City in 1776. Id. at 774-75. The Continental Congress also micromanaged his treatment of certain enemy prisoners of war. Id. at 776-77. While the Continental Congress ended up gradually granting more authority to Washington over the course of the war, this cession was not institutionalized in the subsequent Articles of Confederation, "ratified in 1781, toward the end of the war," which provided that the Congress would effectively continue to be both the legislative and executive branch of government, and would have the "'sole and exclusive right and power'" to exercise the war powers that later were enumerated in Article I of the Constitution. Id. at 780.
Ten of the post-Declaration of Independence state constitutions named the governor as "commander in chief' of the state's militia, but none indicate that this conveyed "preclusive authority" over tactics in the field, and five of them specifically stated that the governor had to exercise this role "in conformity with state law." Id. at 781-82. So, Virginia's Constitution allowed the governor to "'alone have the direction of the militia'" and to "'embody the militia with the advice of the Privy council,'" and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, the "likely ...model for the federal Commander in Chief Clause in 1787," stated that even the many substantive executive war powers it enumerated must be exercised by the commander in chief "agreeably to ... the laws of the land, and not otherwise." Id. at 782-83. While one can argue that less weight should be given to the experience under the Continental Congress and Articles of Confederation because they did not embody a separately elected executive distinct from the legislative body, that argument cannot be made with the state constitutional schemes involving a popularly elected governor (such as Massachusetts). Id. at 781-83. Even one of the popular critics of the drafts of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution who argued for greater executive war powers, the pamphleteer who published the Essex Result, agreed that it was wise that "the legislative body may controul" the governor's decisions as to troop deployment outside the state. Id. at 784.
As to the drafting of the federal Constitution, one quiver in the opposing argument is that the Constitution's Government and Regulation Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, omitted a phrase that had been included in the equivalent part of the Articles of Confederation, whose Article IX stated Congress had the power of "making rules for the government and regulation of the . . . land and naval forces, and di-argued, the clause does nothing more than convey "the powers of the first general or admiral," potentially subject to "a dense fabric of rules that lay in the hands of Congress" pursuant to its enumerated powers to make rules for regulation of the armed forces. Could uncheckable authority over the battlefield derive from the idea that the Framers intended the president to exercise discretion in interpreting and enforcing the laws? The textual source typically cited for this is the Vesting Clause: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. " 28 The Vesting Clause could easily be seen as simply stating that the President has power to exercise all discretionary choices left to him by Congress. However, the Clause is seen by advocates of executive power as implying inherent executive powers not enumerated in the Constitution, owing to the differences between it ("The executive power") and the Legislative Vesting Clause ("All legislative powers herein granted") . 29 Alexander Hamilton was likely the first to make such an argument, 3 " and James Madison perhaps the first to refute it. 31 recting their operations." However, as Barron and Lederman note, the Articles also did not include a structural requirement of bicameralism and presentment for legislation-as the Congress was a deliberating executive body under the Articles-and thus, under the new scheme of separated governmental powers, the notion of "direction" other than by statute might have seemed unworthy of inclusion in the text of Article I. Id. at 789. Nothing in the state ratifying debates militates strongly to the opposing view, id. at 792-94, and Alexander Hamilton's public defenses of the proposed constitution expressly stated that the new Commander in Chief would simply have the powers akin to those of the Massachusetts governor. Id. at 789, 797 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton)). As noted above, Hamilton's defenses-perhaps the most valuable clues to the historical understanding we haveprimarily expressed concern with the notion of a multiple-headed executive, not with the notion that the Commander in Chief should be subject to regulation by statute. Id. at 797-99 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton): "It is one thing [for the executive] to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government .... "). 27 ("The second article of the Constitution of the United States, section first, establishes this general proposition, that 'the EXECUTIVE POWER shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.' . . . The general doctrine of our Constitution... is that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which are expressed in the instrument."), available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/ library/index.asp?document=429.
31 HELVIDiuS No. 2 (James Madison) (Aug. 31, 1793) ("A concurrent authority in two independent departments, to perform the same function with respect to the same Opponents of Hamilton's reading point to the Take Care Clause, 3 2 mandating that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." These Madisonians believe the President's primary role is to faithfully execute laws passed by the "most dangerous branch," not to act unilaterally. The president has no exclusive inherent powers, over war or anything else; put another way, there is no unenumerated power vested in the federal government over which Congress is foreclosed from legislating. To the extent any such unenumerated federal powers exist, 33 they are fields of concurrent authority between the political branches, 34 and when Congress does legislate in such a field it occupies the field and binds the President to "faithfully execute" its decisions. 3 5 This reading has the advantage that it is "consistent with the two dominant principles of constitutional interpretation: separation of powers and checks and balances." 3 6 It also has the advantage of elegance, holding the executive, legislative, and judicial functions as well-separated between branches as possible. Moreover, if one assumes, sensibly, that Congress may freely delegate some of these regulatory powers to the President, this reading also has the advantage of not making permanent any particular policy choices about the wisdom of placing certain war powers in one branch or another. Given how much of an experiment the Founders were undertaking in removing from the executive war powers that had traditionally been monarchical prerogatives, building in some such flexibility would be wise.
thing, would be as awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory."), available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=429. 34 Cf Barron & Lederman, supra note 12, at 726 (describing a "reciprocity model" under which "the war powers of each political branch are presumed to be extensive and, for that reason, blended and overlapping with those of the competing branch," which, the authors believe, is suggested by Justice Jackson in Youngstown).
35 Nothing in this discussion implies that Congress' powers in such fields are not delegable to the executive, adding complication to any discussion of these matters that attempts to ground its conclusions in historical practice. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 19, at 1320 n.5.
36 Epstein, supra note 27, at 320.
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If the President is in fact responsible merely for executing the law as pronounced by the other two branches, then the authority to regulate the movement of troops on the battlefield becomes quite clear. Congress cannot micromanage the conduct of war by actually displacing the President's executive function of implementing its rules for the conduct of the war any more than it can micromanage prosecutorial discretion to enforce the criminal laws in the most efficient way the President deems fit.
3 7 So, for example, Congress could not appoint, by statute, an "ersatz" commander in chief to run the war, immune from removal by the President. 3 8 But Congress can regulate the conduct of warfare (or of one specific war) in ways that do not displace the President's role as chief magistrate in implementing and enforcing the rules set by Congress. This is my preferred interpretation, and it leads to the conclusion that there is no unregulable core to the war powers, even on the battlefield itself. There, the President has final decision-making authority to implement the decisions Congress makes, but there is no limit to the degree of detail that Congress can specify for the conduct of war. Thus, for example, Congress could pass a law prohibiting shelling on a foreign battlefield within one-hundred yards of a school under any circumstances. 38 See Prakash, supra note 19, at 1320 (assuming President's Commander in Chief power is not delegable to Congress, "Congress could neither act as a plural CINC nor appoint an ersatz CINC to make decisions committed to the actual CINC"); Cole, supra note 19, at 34 ("If Congress sought to place authority to direct battlefield operations in an officer not subject to the president's supervision, for example, such a statute would likely violate the president's role as Commander-in-Chief."); Epstein, supra note 27, at 321 ("[T]he principle of checks and balances is at work here. The power to make general rules is checked in effect by the inability of Congress (given the Vesting Clause) to oust the President from office, or from his role of commander in chief.").
Interestingly, historical practice recognizes the right of Congress to create binding rules about appointments of lower-level field commanders. So, for instance, Lincoln was greatly hindered in the task of finding competent top-level generals for the Union army by "legislated seniority rules that prevented certain generals from serving under other generals, thereby restricting the President's discretion to appoint theater commanders." Hartzman, supra note 19, at 99.
39 Barron and Lederman cite the "common idea" that it would be impermissible for Congress "to instruct the President to take a certain hill." Barron & Lederman, constitutionally acceptable, even if it puts American troops at grave risk-Congress might have made the judgment that the cost-benefit calculus still comes out positively, and should be allowed to make such policy determinations. 4° The President gets to actually carry out the implementation of those regulations-so, for instance, if there was reasonable leeway in the interpretation of "school" that might be left to the President's discretion-but not trump the legislation outright. 4 1
As a practical matter, such a reading has the benefit of preserving uniformity of command-a major concern of the Framers, as it was sorely lacking under the Articles of Confederation (which did not provide for an executive branch) 4 2 -but without conveying an uncheckable discretion in the executive that seems counter to the spirit of the entire document. (Perhaps it was these concerns for having a single general in charge of all the nation's armed forcesanimated by specific experience with a multiple-headed command during the Revolutionary War-that Hamilton had in mind when he wrote, in Federalist 74, that "[o]f all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single supra note 12, at 753; id. at 755 (giving examples: "Take Hamburger Hill"; "Land at Utah Beach"). Of course, as a practical matter, these sorts of situations rarely arise within the context of a larger war because legislation is a slow process-the requirements of bicameralism and presentment preclude Congress from legislating rapidly enough to countermand executive tactical decisions in this level of detail. See id. at 760 (describing narrow circumstances under which such regulatory opportunities might occur if President announced in advance, e.g., his intent to "firebomb an urban setting"). However, I find little to distinguish such a hypothetical from a more typical Congressional command-to defeat Imperial Japan, or to destroy Al Qaeda and all who harbored it. Cf id., at 752 (setting forth arguments that would distinguish between impermissible "affirmative commands and negative prohibitions"). But see id., at 755 (criticizing arguments as untenable). As another pair of scholars put it, "[i] t is not for want of constitutional power that Congress has not controlled the movement of troops more frequently; it is because the problems of military management do not lend Absolutely not. Congress may furnish no Army and Navy at all, or it may provide one that consists solely of a battalion of people carrying slingshots. The President may feel tremendously frustrated. Too bad. He will command nothing more than a battalion of slingshots.").
41 Enforcement-at least judicial enforcement-of such regulation could present a variety of difficult challenges outside the scope of this paper. 42 See Hartzman, supra note 19, at 72-77; id. at 77 n. 90 (documenting Framers' concerns over having fragmented national military command over armed forces and militia); id. at 85, 87 (explaining that there was no executive branch).
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This interpretation is consistent with the limited case law: In Little v. Barreme," the Supreme Court held unlawful a seizure pursuant to presidential order of a ship during the "Quasi War" with France. President Adams had ordered seizure of vessels "bound to or from French ports." The Court unanimously found that Congress had authorized the seizure only of ships going to France, and therefore the President could not unilaterally order the seizure of a ship coming from France. 4 5 My interpretation is also consistent with a frequently ignored component of the political branches' war powers: the Militia clauses. As Richard Epstein has pointed out, the Commander in Chief Clause states that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief' not only of the federal armed forces but also "of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." 4 6 The qualifier "when called into the actual service" of the federal government is a reference back to Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16." Clause 15 gives Congress the power to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions," and the text "makes it clear that Congress itself does not have the power to call forth the militia, but in fact must pass some statute which will decide how and when the militia shall be called into the [service of the] United States. It would be odd if it could devolve that power onto itself, so the clear implication is that it can set by rules and regulations the conditions under which the President may, as commander in chief, call the militia into actual service." 48 The authority to set such conditions on presidential command of the militia is granted to Congress in the following clause:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, 43 See Barron & Lederman, supra note 12, at 798 ("Hamilton was inveighing against the notion of a multiple executive."). As the authors note, it is easy to conclude that the "commander-in-chief' title is "purely a hierarchical designation." Id. at 729. 44 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 45 Interestingly, the Court implied that in the absence of such a limiting provision in the statute, the President might have had the power to enforce his order as an implementation of Congress' neutrality Act. 6 U.S. at 177-78. The Act itself contained sections constraining movement of naval forces: "it shall be the duty of the commander of such public armed vessel, to seize every such ship or vessel engaged in such illicit commerce, and send the same to the nearest port in the United States" (emphasis added). 1804 U.S. Lexis 255 at *3. 46 The practical implications of the opposing position would be extreme in terms of disrupting settled practice. Modern law of war treaties implement quite detailed regulations about the conduct of war, prisoner detention and treatment, and so forth, and it is difficult to imagine that Congress lacks the power to implement those treaties-many of which are at the level of customary international law if not jus cogens-or provide punishment for violations of treaty provisions that are self-executing with legislation that binds the President. Prisoners of War.
5 3 As Professor Prakash points out, the implications might be extreme for peacetime practice as well, for Congress has historically ordered the shifting of troops during times of peace, and in theory little distinguishes (for example) the closure of military bases from ordering the retreat of soldiers on the battlefield.
5 4 Indeed, the historical record contains many instances where Congress has "directed or limited the movement of troops" in both peacetime and at war. 55 With all that said, the conduct of war on the battlefield is not my chief concern. Since 9/11, we've seen a number of false analogies to this idea of a core power to defend the United States in any 53 See infra note 79. 54 See Prakash, supra note 19, at 1322 n.13 ("Whether or not we are at war, one might seem a regulation of soldiers as much as the other. Moreover, the President is CINC whether we are at war or not, and the text of the Constitution gives us little reason to suppose that the President has more CINC power during wartime."); see also way the President sees fit, immune from regulation in any way by Congress (with these limits on Congress' powers not bounded by the narrow terms of the Protection or Republican Form of Government clauses). There are three areas where this administration has claimed that Congress lacks the power to regulate the president's activities, at least where they relate to a core war power: detention of "enemy combatants," torture (typically as part of the interrogation of "enemy combatants"), and electronic surveillance.
DETENTION
Prior to 9/11, authority to detain United States citizens was thought to be governed by the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) ("NDA"), which provides that " [n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." The Non-Detention Act was enacted specifically to ensure that the internment of Japanese-Americans following the bombing of Pearl Harbor would not be repeated. 5 6 (Recall that large numbers of the interned had been born in the United States and were U.S. citizens.) Section 4001(a) was intended, as an initial matter, "to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950."" 7 Under the Emergency Detention Act, the Executive was authorized in time of war or national emergency to detain persons as "to whom there is reasonable ground to believe will engage in . . . acts of espionage or of sabotage." ' 8 Presumably, Congress intended to force resort to criminal charges pursuant to federal criminal statutes ("an Act of Congress") and attendant pre-trial detention (with all its protections, e.g., the probable cause requirement) any time a citizen was "detained by the United States." For citizens fighting against United States armed forces on a foreign battlefield, presumably an appropriate criminal charge would be supplied by the treason statute: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, The NDA was thus at the center of the legal dispute between the government and Yaser Hamdi, a born citizen of the United States allegedly captured post-9 /11 on the battlefield in Afghanistan. 60 The government advanced several different arguments in favor of the conclusion that the NDA should not bar Hamdi's continued detention. First, the government argued that the NDA was never intended to reach military detentions, and applies only to detention by civilian authorities.
6 " This argument seems belied by the broad wording of the statutory text, which applies to any detention "by the United States," and is not limited to detention by civilian authorities. Relatedly, the government argued that the NDA did not apply to detentions that took place on active battlefields, whether at home or abroad. The legislative history of the final 1970 act (which by and large was the only legislative history cited in the briefs in the case) spoke to the japanese-American internments during World War II. While those detentions took place during wartime, the victims were displaced from the West Coast of the United States, rather than removed from any active battlefield, and this has led critics to claim that the NDA's authors must not have contemplated battlefield detentions, and thus could not have intended the NDA to apply to such detentions. However, the legislative history of the first versions of the act spoke of the fear that urban guerrilla warfare would lead to widespread military detentions in American inner cities. 62 the possibility of domestic battlefield detentions and decided to make explicit that they were outside the scope of executive authority. Next, the government argued that the AUMF constituted "an Act of Congress" authorizing Hamdi's detention within the terms of the NDA. This argument eventually prevailed in the Supreme Court, albeit with fractured opinions offering little clarity on the scope of the authority conveyed to the executive under the AUMF The fact that the Hamdi plurality bought into the statutory authorization argument meant that the Court never addressed 6 4 the This irrefutable history still weighs heavily upon members of racial minority groups when they view title II. More recent events have not helped calm these apprehensions. For example, on May 6, 1968, the predecessor to this committee issued a report (H. REP. No. 90-1351) entitled "Guerrilla Warfare Advocates in the United States," in which it was suggested that detention camps "might well be utilized for the temporary imprisonment of warring guerrillas." Shortly thereafter, the chairman of the committee at that time (Mr. Willis) was publicly quoted as stating that this reference was to "mixed Communist and Black Nationalist elements across the nation."
The fears that such statements and other related materials have created in the black communities in our country, have reached epidemic proportions. . . . The younger, more militant blacks are particularly concerned.
Id.
63 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use."). The plurality offered no guidance as to what types of executive actions would be considered "fundamental and accepted" incidents of warfare so as to be authorized by the AUMF (or any future authorization for the use of force), and two years later, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006), the Supreme Court would sharply limit the availability of this argument in other contexts. In Hamdan, the government argued that the AUMF authorized the President to create a military commissions system to try violators of the law of war outside of the careful scheme Congress had previously established by statute in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Court rejected this argument, noting that "there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the [Uniform Code of Military Justice]." In the absence of such "specific, overriding authorization," id., the Court found that Congress had not displaced the limits on the President's authority to constitute military commissions that it had previously established with the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a comprehensive scheme subjecting such commissions to the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions. 64 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-17 (plurality opinion) ("The Government maintains that no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution. We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such authority, however, because we ultimate argument made by the government: that, to the extent the NDA restricted the President's power to detain persons on the battlefield, it trenched upon the President's inherent war powers and was thus unconstitutional. 5 While the government couched this line of argument in terms of constitutional doubt in Padilla and Hamdi, in its most aggressive version it claims that Congress lacks the authority to regulate prisoner of war captures at all, and that thus such battlefield detentions are not governed by Youngstown-that is, battlefield detentions are not within an area of overlapping (or simply unenumerated) powers, but instead are within a sphere of exclusive executive authority. Indeed, the administration made the same argument with respect to the habeas statute, 6 7 claiming that construing it to apply to the Guantinamo detainees "would directly interfere with the Executive's conduct of the military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters," and would raise "grave constitutional problems." 6 8 All nine Justices in Rasul ultimately rejected this position. Even the dissenters believed that it was within Congress' power to extend the habeas statute to aliens accused of being members of al Qaeda and held at Guantdnamo-they simply believed Congress had not in fact intended to do so. 69 Nonetheless, months later, the Administration argued in the Hamdan case that interpreting the Uniform Code of Military justice "to reflect congressional intent to limit the President's authority" agree with the Government's alternative position, that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi's detention, through the AUMF."); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops, I agree with the plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has authorized the President to do so."). Compare this attitude to President Jefferson's understanding: in his first annual message to Congress, Jefferson related that he had sent warships to defend American commercial shipping after receiving threats from Tripoli, one of the Barbary states. Tripolitan pirates in fact did attack American shipping, and after ferocious fighting, their vessel and its crew were captured, but as the Navy was " [u] nauthorized by the constitution, [and] without the sanction of Congress, to go out beyond the line of defence, the [Tripolitan] vessel being disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew."'" Even while defending against an enemy (arguably) attacking in violation of the laws of war, Jefferson believed the Navy lacked authority to hold prisoners any longer than absolutely necessary to the defensive effort without the sanction of Congress. Similarly, Yaser Hamdi argued that only Congress could authorize prolonged detention of American citizens-that is, that affirmative authority from Congress was required to allow executive detention of citizens (at least outside the immediate battlefield) .72
Hamdi's argument raises an interesting final question: where exactly is Congress' constitutional authority to regulate wartime detention found? There is seemingly no provision in the Constitution directly authorizing Congressional power over POWs. Although to modern ears the text of the Captures Clause (granting Congress the power to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" 7 3 ) appears to authorize prisoner detentions, the clause In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign, Section 2340A must be construed as not applying to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority. As our office has consistently held during this Administration and previous Administrations, Congress lacks authority under Article I to set the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the conduct of operations during a war.
...
Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield. [Vol. 11:23
Again, note the scope of the claim here: the Bybee Memo does not argue that Congress is prohibited from taking on the executive task of interpreting and implementing "terms and conditions" set forth in statute; instead, Congress is prohibited from setting those "terms and conditions" in the first place.
This argument is capable of extension to many other criminal prohibitions on abuse of detainees. Beyond the War Crimes Act 8 4 and the Torture Statute, the federal assault statute 5 and the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (10 U.S.C. § § 893, 928)86 could apply to abusive practices by military interrogators. The torture statute seems only to have been the subject of the most concern.
The OLC's arguments appear to have become more aggressive as time has passed, consistently emphasizing Congress' lack of constitutional authority to regulate the President in his core power to direct battlefield operations. Interestingly, the argument appears to have developed slowly, as if the analogy between exclusive control of troop movements and exclusive power to decide on the use of torture was not initially perceived as bulletproof. So, in a January 2002 memorandum, DOJ lawyers concluded that "restricting the President's plenary power over military operations (including the treatment of prisoners)" would be "constitutionally dubious" and to read any statute in such a manner would require that "Congress clearly demonstrates such an intent." 8 " By August that year the Bybee Memo was written, and through December 2003 and possibly longer, the White House's official position was that "Congress lacks authority" to regulate its treatment of prisoners. 8 At 84 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006). 85 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2002) . The assault statute applies by its own terms to geographic locations within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (generally including Guant.namo even according to OLC, see http://balkin. blogspot.com/Philbin07l4O4.pdf), and to actions by members of the armed forces or accompanying personnel under the terms of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 3261-67 (2001) . 86 See 10 U.S.C. § 893 (prohibiting engaging in "cruelty... oppression or maltreatment"); 10 U.S.C. § 928 (prohibiting assault and the threat of assault). 87 Memorandum from John C. order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority. Congress lacks authority under Article 1 to set the terms and conditions under which some point in December 2003, John Yoo's replacement at OLC, Jack Goldsmith, instructed the Department of Defense (DOD) to no longer rely on the advice contained in this "Working Group" memo, and follow-up letters 9 indicated that DOD stopped using the techniques that had been approved pursuant to the memo well before Goldsmith's office issued a formal withdrawal of the Working Group Memo in December 2005 or a formal memo rescinding Bybee's in December 2004. Of course, the most brutal atrocities committed by the military's detainee operations occurred during this period, both in Guantdnamo and Abu Ghraib.
Despite the formal repeal by OLC of the Bybee and Working Group Memos, the argument that there exists an uncheckable executive power to torture seems to be alive and well within the highest levels of the administration. In a January 27, 2006 interview with CBS News, President Bush said "I don't think a president can order torture. 7 unless it was: (1) authorized by some other subsequent congressional statute, (2) within an exemption to the statute, or (3) the FISA statute itself was ultra vires-that is, beyond Congress' constitutional authority to restrict the President. The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) brought suit over the Prosurveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
... These orders are innovative, they are complex, and it took considerable time and work for the Government to develop the approach that was proposed to the Court and for the Judge on the FISC to consider and approve these orders. [Vol. 11:23
gram on January 17, 2006, and filed a motion for summary judgment seven weeks later. 9 8 As with the NDA in the detention context, the administration first argued that FISA was not intended to apply in war, 99 and next that the AUMF constituted statutory authority to ignore FISA as to surveillance that had a sufficient nexus to the intended targets 1°0 of the AUMF. While the "exclusive means" provision makes no reference to an exemption for surveillance otherwise authorized by statute, any subsequent statute actually intending to repeal the exclusive means provision could accomplish that effect. But how much evi- Of course, FISA itself contemplated a state of war, and contains a limited exemption for surveillance in the very first days of a declared war: "Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress." 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000). The purpose.of this exemption was not to embody a policy decision that all restrictions should be lifted during wartime, but rather simply the notion that fifteen days would be adequate time for both houses to consider and pass any amendment to FISA that might be required by the exigencies of wartime. See H.R. RPP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (fifteen-day period intended to "allow time for consideration of any amendment to [FISA] that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency.").
100 The AUMF states "[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. IV 2004). Thus the scope of surveillance that could conceivably be authorized by it would be limited to surveillance against persons or groups with some nexus to the 9/11 attacks. This takes some of the steam out of the argument that, because Congress made small technical adjustments to FISA several times in the years since 9/ 11, it must not have intended wholesale revision of FISA. The technical adjustments-for instance, the revision of the "emergency surveillance" period in 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0 from "twenty-four hours" to "72 hours," which was changed by section 314(a) (2) However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan swept the ground from under the government's argument.
10 3 In the absence of "specific, overriding authorization" in the AUMF,'°4 the Court found that Congress had not displaced the limits on the President's authority to constitute military commissions that it had previously established with the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a comprehensive scheme subjecting such commissions to the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions. 0 5 FISA is a similarly comprehensive scheme regulating wiretapping for foreign intelligence surveillance, and there is similarly "nothing ... even hinting" at a Congressional intent to change that scheme in the text or legislative history of the AUMF.'°6 So, once again, the government was left with its ultimate argument: that FISA is unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to regulate the core presidential surveillance powers that are implicit in his Article II powers to defend the nation against attack:
[T]he NSA activities ... are primarily an exercise of the President's authority as Commander in Chief during an armed conflict that Congress expressly has authorized the President to pursue.... The core of the Commander in Chief power is the authority to direct the Armed Forces in conducting a military campaign.
Indeed, if an interpretation of FISA that allows the President to conduct the NSA activities were not "fairly possible," FISA would be unconstitutional as applied in the context of this congressionally authorized armed conflict. In that event, FISA would purport to prohibit the President from undertaking actions necessary to fulfill his constitutional obligation to protect the Nation from foreign attack in the context of a congressionally authorized armed conflict with an enemy that has already staged the most deadly foreign attack in our Nation's history.
10 7
The argument linking surveillance powers to the battlefield roughly runs as follows: the President has unregulable powers over tactical decisions (such as movement of troops) on the battlefield. One such tactical decision is how to carry out surveillance of the enemy's military communications in the theater of battle. (Even if it were not one of the core tactical powers, such surveillance is so necessary to the decisions about how to move the troops around that it should be considered part and parcel of the unquestioned core power over troop movement.) As such, Congress may not regulate it in any fashion. There is no direct precedent for the position that the President has inherent, unregulable surveillance powers. The most frequent citation offered by the government 0 8 in support of the general proposition that FISA may be unconstitutional insofar as it trenches on some inherent executive surveillance power is the following dicta from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review: 0 9 "We take for granted that the President does have that authority [to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information] and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the President's constitutional power. " "' Like much of the "authority" for an uncheckable power over troop movements, this brief dictum is a weak foundation for the claims laid upon it. 111 See Barron & Lederman, supra note 12, at 761 n.212 ("the FISA Court of Review did not provide any justification of that dictum."). Note thatJudge Laurence Silberman, at the time one of the three judges on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, was in 1978 a former DOJ staffer who gave testimony to the same effect arguing against the passage of FISA when the bill was under consideration by Citing a less tendentious source, the government notes that the scope of Congressional power to regulate intelligence gathering was a matter of debate during the enactment of FISA:
Indeed, when it enacted the FISA, Congress itself recognized that it was proceeding on fragile and unsettled ground, noting that it was seeking to press its own constitutional powers to their limit, that it was unsettled what that limit was, and that the Supreme Court might therefore find that it has unconstitutionally intruded on the President's powers." 2 I closed our discussion of detention powers, above, with some thoughts on the location within the Constitution of Congress' power to regulate prisoner of war detentions. Similar questions are posed by Congress' assertions of power to regulate electronic surveillance. 1 13 Even more starkly than with the detention power, the argument that FISA may be unconstitutional as applied to a core part of an inherent executive war power is made possible in part by the fact that the Constitution nowhere mentions surveillance powers. Assuming the federal government is vested with such powers, there is ambiguity as to whether such power is assigned to the executive, the legislature, or shared between them. There are several alternative places the courts might look to locate a Congressional power to regulate surveillance. The most obvious, and the most likely correct," 4 is the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause, for instance, was the source of authority for the Telecommunications Act of 1934,15 regulating the power of the executive to obtain electronic communications from carriers.' 16 In no case that I can find has anyone directly challenged the constitutionality of the 1934 Act, and many cases seem to accept the Act's constitutionality. 117 Although the Act's wiretapping restrictions were motivated by concerns for the privacy of domestic communications,"' the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate both international and domestic commerce. There are other potential sources of authority as well. As regards regulation of surveillance carried out specifically by the NSA, an arm of the Defense Department, one might also point to the clauses enumerating Congressional power to regulate the armed forces, or indeed to the Necessary and Proper Clause 12 0 -which, it is often forgotten, allows Congress to make laws for "carrying into Execution the foregoing [Article I] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." 1 2 1 More generally, Congress has been given power to provide for common lines of communication throughout the Union-the power "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads" 1 22 -and I believe one could reasonably draw analogies to close regulation of common lines of electronic communications and related communications infrastructure. 123 All of this is putting to one side the Fourth Amendment 124 and Congress' power to provide provisions for the issuance of warrants complying with the Amendment's requirements of particularity and probable cause. 12 5
Either way, there does not seem to be much of an argument for the idea of a core executive surveillance power that is not amenable to regulation by Congress. After all, Congress also needs to gather information in the course of carrying out its "core" legislative activities, and no one argues that Congress can conduct electronic surveillance without statutory authority.
126
If the notion of a general AUMF authorization defense is the first line of defense for the government-greatly weakened by Hamdan-and the second defense rests on the unconstitutionality of Congressional regulation of surveillance germane to the core presidential power to defend the nation from hostile attack, each of these defenses is accompanied by a corresponding meta-defense based on the state secrets privilege.
As to the AUMF, this meta-defense runs as follows: In both our case and the ACLU's similar case, the government claims that it could explain how the program fits into what Congress authorized in the AUMF-namely, the "use [of] all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist tion power is one clear example, the Constitution specifying only that uniform rules of naturalization can be made by Congress. Immigration was basically a state concern prior to 1875; after it became a federal concern through the passage of the first national immigration legislation, the Supreme Court eventually accepted that it was a federal power grounded in inherent powers sovereign states as recognized by international law. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833 REv. (1993 .
Powers "inherent in sovereignty" are at least arguably shared between the political branches, especially where Congress has not spoken at all to a matter. Is there a core of such power that is exclusive to the executive branch? Again, I'd argue that there is not. Note the language of the necessary and proper clause: Congress can "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all ... Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Presumably this includes the unenumerated powers as well as the enumerated. Thus the notion in Jackson's Youngstown concurrence recognizing that some powers may be assumed by the executive in the face of Congressional silence, but, if Congress has spoken to a subject and is not foreclosed by the Constitution from regulating it, the President's powers may shrink to nothing. 126 Congress, of course, has information-gathering (subpoena) and investigatory powers (e.g. inherent contempt) in furtherance of this core legislative power. ' and those who harbored them-but to do so it would have to explain to the court how the Program works, particularly who it was targeting and what kinds of communications it was intercepting. The sensitivity of that information about how the Program works in practice means that it cannot do that, even ex parte in camera. Thus, the government argues, the State Secrets Privilege forecloses the ability to litigate these questions.
128
As to the FISA-is-unconstitutional defense, the meta-defense argues that for the government to explain to the court how the Program fits into the core of the President's inherent power to defend the nation-that (limited) core aspect of the war power that is so fundamentally executive as to be immune to regulation from Congress-would require disclosing state secrets to the court. Since FISA might be unconstitutional to the extent that it restricts such a hypothetical core, unregulable part of the executive war power, the court cannot rely on FISA in enjoining the President from carrying out such surveillance:
any assessment of whether the exercise of Presidential authority at issue in this case is lawful would require a detailed exposition of the activities authorized-including the specific nature of the intelligence information, sources, and methods underlying the TSP and, in particular, information demonstrating why the normal FISA process would not be sufficient and would therefore intrude on the President's responsibility to protect the Nation.129 According to the government, the issue of whether FISA forecloses all executive surveillance is thus unlitigable.
CONCLUSIONS
To some extent these arguments justifying executive power to 
